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The 2005 food crisis centered in Niger received worldwide attention and extensive media 
coverage. Crops suffered from poor rainfall and were plagued by locusts throughout the 
growing season. Malnutrition flourished with the sudden disruption in food supplies. 
One-fifth of Niger’s children suffered from moderate to severe forms of malnutrition by 
the summer of 2005. In an era of increased awareness and the introduction of famine 
early warning systems, the development community was left wondering why they were 
for the most part caught off guard by the food crisis. This paper tests whether market 
prices and price discovery could have played an active role in detecting the food crisis.  
Directed acyclic graphs are used to test whether price discovery mechanisms within 
Niger’s millet markets were ahead of the early warning systems. Results suggest that as 
early as October 2005 markets in Arlit and the Dosso province had price anomalies that 
appeared to begin signaling the upcoming food crisis. This market based discovery came 
about two months earlier than the warnings issued by the regional early warning 
networks.  INTRODUCTION 
The recent food crisis centered in Niger received worldwide attention during the summer 
of 2005. An estimated three million persons were affected by the crisis in Niger alone, 
with an additional million affected in the neighboring country of Mali (FEWSNET 2005). 
With only fragile safety-nets to fall back on the rural communities were hard hit. Caloric 
intake fell by as much as one-third in areas already prone to chronically low levels of 
food consumption. Malnutrition flourished as households were forced to cutback on 
meals and shift to low quality substitutes. One-fifth of Niger’s children suffered from 
moderate to severe forms of malnutrition by the summer of 2005 (WHO 2005). Although 
an official death toll has not been announced, all of the major relief agencies reported 
deaths due to starvation amidst the food crisis.  
The rains came late and left early in the 2004 growing season (Eilerts 2005). 
Crops that managed to ward-off drought succumbed to locusts, which often ate better 
than humans. In Niger national food production fell by 11 percent, but plummeted 
severely in the areas least equipped to handle adversity. Food production in the northern 
and eastern provinces dropped by as much as 35 percent in 2004 (FEWS NET). As bad as 
these numbers sound Niger has averted crises under similar shocks to its food production. 
Most agree that the 2004 crisis was caused more by high prices and a lack of money in 
consumers’ pockets than by a shortage of food in markets (The Economist 2005). 
Consider for instance that other countries in the region suffered even worse crop 
production losses
3 (GIEWS NET 2005).   
                                                 
3 “.. cereal production, compared to the previous year’s good levels, was estimated to have decreased by 66 
percent in Cape-Verde, 44 percent in Mauritania, 35 percent in Chad and 27 percent in Senegal. In spite of 
severe localized damage, decreases compared to the five-year average were relatively limited in Burkina Staple food markets react poorly to scarcity and are prone to volatility in this 
region of the world. A lack of substitutes creates a nearly inelastic demand schedule that 
sends prices skyward under even modest supply shocks. The 11 percent drop in Niger’s 
food production caused on average a doubling of staple food prices from the fall of 2004 
through the summer of 2005 (USAID 2005). Rural households were priced out of the 
staple food markets even in areas where food aid was being injected at subsidized prices. 
Purchasing power continued to weaken as livestock markets collapsed under such strong 
selling pressure (Sánchez-Montero 2005). Making matters worse were restrictions placed 
on exports by neighboring countries Mali, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso (The Economist 
2005).     
Early warning systems were designed to forecast food crises and famines looming 
on the horizon. A properly functioning system should be able to look-ahead and predict 
events two to three months in advance to grant relief agencies adequate lead time. Donors 
have invested in a famine early warning network (FEWS NET) that operates throughout 
the West African Sahel. FEWS is a modern system that monitors a variety of information 
linked to food security including production, income, and food prices. Warnings are 
issued by FEWS when indicators signal upcoming shocks to food supply.  
Market prices are a potentially useful source of information for monitoring food 
security. The region has undergone structural adjustment in its staple food markets 
leaving most of the markets under private control (Jones 1995). Economic agents form 
price expectations using forecasting techniques and engage in the process of price 
discovery that cause market prices to react to future events. While agents’ forecasting 
                                                                                                                                                 
Faso, Niger (11 percent) and Mali, the major cereal producing countries in the region.” Excerpt taken 
from GIEWS 2005. methods are not fully understood it’s that they could be more accurate than early warning 
systems such as FEWS. So analyzing how discoveries in staple food market prices 
behaved before, during, and after the crisis provides food security analysts with important 
information. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role that price discovery could have 
played in alerting food security analysts of the impending crisis in Niger. In particular 
this paper tests a working hypothesis that economic agent-based price discovery 
mechanisms in the food markets were better able to forecast the crisis than FEWS, a 
formally structured price monitoring system. This research is not intended to place blame 
or point fingers. Rather this paper attempts to add insight, through gathering empirical 
evidence, on the value of incorporating more detailed market based information into early 
warning systems such as FEWS.          
 
BACKGROUND 
Niger is a land locked country located in the West African Sahel, an area characterized by 
its aridness and proximity to the Saharan desert
4. Agricultural production remains highly 
dependent on rainfall. Irrigation is available only in limited areas along the Niger River 
provides, leaving most of the country vulnerable to drought (Figure 1). Even in an 
average production year Niger cannot feed itself. Average cereal production hovers 
around 11 million kg of cereals, enough in principle to provide only about 91.6 kg to each 
of its 12 million inhabitants. This requires an on-going need for food imports from 
neighboring countries and the rest-of-the-world (typically food aid).     
                                                 
4 The Sahel is taken from the Arabic word Sahil, which refers to a border or shore. Here it distinguishes the 
Sahel as the region that borders the Saharan desert.    Niger’s population is concentrated in the southwest portion of the country where 
rainfall is highest (Figure 1). In this region, where rainfall averages 500 mm per year, 
population densities range between 50 and 200 persons per km
2. To the north both 
rainfall and population density quickly drop off. There is a fairly large area where rainfall 
is between 200-350 mm/year, just adequate for millet production. Population densities in 
this area range between 3-10 persons/km
2. Above this is the pastoral region, where 





The working hypothesis is tested empirically using an econometric model. Specifically, 
the model tests how accurately market based agents were able to forecast the impending 
2004 Niger food crisis. Directed acyclical graphs (DAG) are employed to analyze a time 
series of cereal price data from the West Africa region
5. In practical terms, DAG 
develops a timeline of what happened before, during, and after the 2005 Niger food crisis 
from the perspective of the economic agents engaged in the cereal markets. The DAG 
method determines when market signals, through innovations in price discovery, were 
first sent throughout the regional markets of an impending food crisis.  
The econometric results from the DAG model are then compared to the forecasts 
made by regional food security agencies such as FEWS. An alternative timeline is 
constructed based on how the early warning systems discovered and monitored the food 
                                                 
5 In previous research DAG provided empirical support that cereal markets in a neighboring country, Mali, 
functioned adequately following liberalization and market reform (Vitale and Bessler 2006). The results 
from the Mali study suggest an active role for DAG in the food security context. Cereal prices were 
discovered primarily in the cereal deficit region of Mopti, and were found to flow to the surplus region of 
Sikasso. crisis. This timeline is developed using historical records and published reports from 
FEWS and other food security agencies working in the region. The two timelines are 
compared to determine which approach was first to detect the food crisis. This provides 
empirical support, for or against, the working hypothesis that market based agents were 
better able to predict the 2004 Niger food crisis.    
The empirical analysis is based on a (co-integrated) vector autoregression (VAR) 
model in which directed acyclic graphs are used to sort-out causal flows of price 
information in contemporaneous time. The econometric analysis is conducted using 
directed acyclical graphs (DAG). This is an approach that estimates price information 
flows among markets. DAG models determine in which market(s) innovations in price 
discovery take place, as well as the directions in which prices flow to other markets. We 
present our general model below in two sub-sections:  ECM (error correction model) and 
DAG (Directed Acyclic Graphs). 
 
The ECM      







































 where i is the regional market. If the series are non-stationary (which we expect for prices 
in a free market, we explore this below), the vector Xt  can be modeled in an error 
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Equation (1) resembles a vector autoregression (VAR) model in first differences, except 
for the presence of the lagged levels of 1 − t X .  There are three cases of interest: (a) if Π is 
of full rank, then  t X is stationary in levels and a VAR in levels is an appropriate model; 
(b) if Π  has zero rank, then it contains no long-run information and the appropriate 
model is a VAR in first differences; and (c) if the rank of Π  is a positive number, r, 
which is less than p (the number of series = I), there exist matrices α and β, with 
dimensions p x r, such that Π  = 
' αβ . In such a case,  t X
' β  is stationary, even though 
t X is not.  
The dynamic response patterns summarized by an ECM or a VAR are difficult to 
interpret (Sims, 1980; Swanson and Granger, 1997).  The dynamic price relationships can 
be best summarized through the moving average representation.   Given the estimated 
form of equation (1) (with possible cointegrating vectors, which is applicable in this 
study), we can algebraically re-express equation (1) as a levels VAR.  We can then solve 
for its moving average representation, where the vector Xt is written as a function of the 






i t i t e G X                                          (2)  where Gi is a IxI matrix of moving average parameters, which map historical innovations 
at lag i into the current position of the vector X.
6  In this case the matrix G0 is generally 
not the identity matrix, as the elements of the vector e are usually not orthogonal.   That is 
to say, there may be non-zero correlation between contemporaneous innovations.   
Analysis of equation (2) without making some adjustment for non-orthogonal innovations 
may not reflect the dynamic historical patterns present in the data (see Sims (1980)).  We 
prefer to work with a transformed moving average representation on orthogonalized 
innovations vt = Aet, where A is such that E{vtvt’} = D, where D is a diagonal matrix.  
Research workers employing VAR models have traditionally used a Choleski 
factorization of the (contemporaneous) innovation correlation matrix to provide a Wold 
causal chain on how an innovation in series i reacts to an innovation in series j in 
contemporaneous time.  The Choleski factorization is recursive in its nature and may not 
reflect the “true” causal patterns among a set of contemporaneous innovations.   
More recently, research workers have followed the structural factorization 
commonly referred to as the “Bernanke ordering” (Bernanke, 1986). This approach 
requires writing the innovation vector (e t) from the estimated VAR model as: e t = A
-1vt,  
where, in our case, A is a 10x10 matrix and vt is a 10x1 vector of orthogonal shocks.  
While the Bernanke ordering allows one to move away from the mechanically imposed 
constraint of recursive causal ordering embedded in the Choleski factorization, it requires 
research workers to actually specify a contemporaneous causal pattern among 
innovations. In this study we have very little information for specifying the ordering in a 
Choleski factorization. It is not clear if, in contemporaneous time exogenous price signals 
                                                 
6 While one can actually derive the first n terms of equation (2) analytically, we almost always allow the 
computer to do this following the zero-one simulation as described in Sims (1980). originate on the periphery or extensive limit of Millet production, in the large cities, or in 
the excess production regions.  Accordingly, we abandon any attempt to solve the 
causality in current time question with a Choleski factorization of contemporaneous 
covariance. 
Here we apply directed graph algorithms (see the discussion given below) to place 
zeros on the A matrix (e.g. vt = Aet).  Directed graphs have recently been used in the 
literature for just this purpose in similar time series settings (see, for example, Swanson 
and Granger (1997) and Bessler and Kergna (2002)).    
Given equation (2) (or more precisely, its estimated form) we now can write the 
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Here the vector X is written as an infinite series of orthogonalized innovations, vt-i.   We 
use recent innovations in graph theory and PC algorithm (described below) to determine 
the causal pattern behind the correlation in contemporaneous innovations (Ω = E{etet
’}) 
to construct orthogonal innovations ((E{vtvt
’} =  D ). 
 
Directed Graphs and PC Algorithm 
A directed graph is a picture representing the causal flow among a set of variables. Lines 
with arrowheads are used to represent flows. For instance, A  B indicates that variable 
A causes variable B. A line connecting two variables, C – D, indicates that C and D are 
connected by information flow but it’s not certain whether C causes D or vice versa.  The 
fundamental idea that enables detection of the direction of causal flow to a set of 
(observational) variables is the screening-off phenomena and its more formal representation as d-separation (Pearl, 2000). For three variables A, B and C, if we have 
variable A as a common cause of B and C so that BA C, then the unconditional 
association between B and C will be non-zero, as both have a common cause in A (this 
diagram is labeled a causal fork (Pearl 2000)).  If we measure association (linear 
association by correlation) then B and C will have a non-zero correlation. However, if we 
condition on A, the partial correlation between B and C (given knowledge of A) will be 
zero. Knowledge of the common cause (A) “screens-off” association between its effects 
(B and C).  
  On the other hand, say we have variables D, E, and F such that D EF. Here 
we have E is a common effect of D and F (this diagram is labeled a causal inverted fork 
(Pearl 2000)). D and F will have no association (zero correlation if we constrain 
ourselves to linear association); however, if we condition on E, the association between D 
and F is non-zero (the partial correlation between D and F, given knowledge of E is non-
zero). We say (in the vernacular) knowledge of the common effect does not “screen-off” 
association between its causes.   
  And if we have variables A, B and C forming a causal chain, A B  C, the 
unconditional association (correlation) between A and C will be non-zero, but the 
conditional correlation between A and C, given knowledge of B will be zero. 
  These screening-off phenomena associated with common effects and common 
causes have been recognized in the literature for some fifty years now; see, for example, 
Orcutt (1952), Simon (1953) and Reichenbach (1956). It is only recently that they have 
been formally introduced into the literature for assigning causal flows among three or 
more variables. Key to this modern re-birth is the technical work of Pearl and his associates (see Pearl 2000). Pearl and his collaborators have formalized these screening-
off notions, with the idea of d-separation, which gives the connection between a causal 
diagram and its probability representation. 
  Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (2000) and Pearl (2000) present algorithms with 
similar structures and outputs for inference on directed acyclic graphs from observational 
data.  The former is labeled PC algorithm, embedded in the software TETRAD II and III 
(see the offering at http://www.phil.cmu.edu/projects/tetrad/ and Scheines et al., 1996) 
and described in Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (2000); the latter is IC algorithm 
presented in Pearl (2000, pp.50-51).  Here we offer a brief description of PC algorithm.     
  To begin one forms a complete undirected graph on the set of variables to be 
examined. Say we have three variables X, Y and Z. Form the complete undirected graph 
as:        
                                                                     X   
                                                                 /       \ 
                                                               Y   ⎯   Z 
This graph has a line (edge) connecting each variable with every other variable in a pre-
determined set of variables (theory is a rich source for variable specification). Edges 
between variables are removed sequentially based upon vanishing unconditional 
correlation or higher-order partial correlation at some pre-specified significance level of 
normal distribution.  
   Edges that survive these attempts at removal are then directed by using the notion 
of sepset. The conditioning variable(s) on removed edges between two variables is called 
the sepset of the variables whose edge has been removed (for vanishing zero order conditioning information the sepset is an empty set).  PC algorithm directs the edges 
between X and Y into variable Z if Z is not in the sepset of X and Y.  For our X, Y, Z 
example, suppose we have removed the edge between X and Y not conditional on Z (that 
is, the unconditional correlation between X and Y is zero). We can then direct                  
X ⎯ Z ⎯ Y as X → Z ← Y.  Had Z been used to remove the edge between X and Y (PC 
algorithm removed the edge because the correlation between X and Y conditional on Z 
was zero) then PC algorithm would not be able to direct the edges between X, Y and Z; 
the underlying model may have been a causal fork X ← Z → Y or a causal chain 
 X → Z → Y (recall the screening off discussion given above).  In such a case (the case 
of ambiguity) PC algorithm would leave the remaining edges undirected X ⎯ Z ⎯ Y.   
  If we have other variables in the set of variables studied (in addition to X, Y, and 
Z) the ambiguity illustrate above may be resolved.  In our X, Y, Z example given above, 
PC was not able to direct edges using sepset (because of the same correlation structure 
for causal forks and causal chains), it may be that a fourth variable W can be used to 
overcome the ambiguity. Say after removing edges on the four variable set we are left 
with the undirected graph on X, Y, Z and W:  
                                                              X ⎯ Z ⎯ Y  
                                                                       | 
                                                                     W 
If  Z is not in the sepset of X and W, but Z is in the sepset of X and Y, then using the just 
(or first) the sepset condition PC would return: 
                                                            X → Z ⎯ Y   
                                                                     ↑                                                                     W 
 
However, this inverted fork relation between X, Z and W, resolves the ambiguity on the 
X, Z, Y directions.  The causal fork possibility obviously does not hold.  
PC will thus result in the graph: 
                                                             X → Z → Y   
                                                                     ↑ 
                                                                    W 
PC algorithm has been studied extensively in Monte Carlo simulations in Spirtes, 
Glymour and Scheines (2000) and Demiralp and Hoover (2003).  The algorithm may 
make mistakes of two types: edge inclusion or exclusion and edge direction (orientation); 
the latter appears to be more likely than the former.  Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 
write: “In order of the methods to converge to correct decisions with probability 1, the 
significance level used in making decisions should decrease as the sample size increases 
and the use of higher significance levels (e.g., .2 at sample sizes less than 100, and .1 at 
sample sizes between 100 and 300) may improve performance at small sample sizes.” 
(Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines,  2000, page 116). Nevertheless, the orientation (edge 
direction) decision is less reliable than the edge inclusion decision in PC algorithm; 
results presented below should be viewed with caution and/or interpreted with other 
relevant information. 
 Data 
The time series of millet price observations runs from 1990 through August of 2005 (SIM 
2005). The dataset used in the analysis includes millet markets from Niger, Mali, and 
Burkina Faso. Observations are monthly millet prices paid by consumers. In Niger there 
are 45 markets that encompass the entire country. In Mali and Burkina Faso only the 
large urban markets were included. The Mali dataset had 7 markets and the Burkina Faso 
dataset had 8 markets. The FEWS operating in the West Africa region issued monthly 
reports on food security conditions. These agencies are responsible for monitoring food 
security in the West Africa region.  
 
RESULTS 
Millet prices are highest in the arid, pastoral regions to the north where rainfall is too low 
to support millet production (Figure 2). Millet prices typically hover about 15-25 fcfa/kg 
higher in markets located in the arid areas as opposed to markets located in the wetter 
areas in the southwest corner of Niger. The co-movement of millet prices among the 
markets is visually evident. Each of the market pairs illustrated in Figure 2 is barely 
distinguishable from one another. Even from an informal basis they appear to be 
responding to similar market signals.  
Niger millet prices exhibit strong intra-seasonal variability (Figure 2). The run-up 
in millet prices during the hungry season is particularly strong in the years of food crises. 
In addition to the 2005 food crisis, the summer of 1999 saw almost the same level of 
price increases. In both the 2005 and 1998 food crises millet prices doubled from their previous levels. Price recoveries occur quickly. Following the 1998 food crisis prices 
returned to their long-run average level within two months in each of the markets.         
The DAG analysis found that the twelve Niger markets transmit a high degree of 
market information flows among themselves (Figure 3). Eight co-integrating vectors 
were found, and all of the price series were found to be mean non-stationary. This 
indicates that none of the markets appear to be sluggish in how they respond to price 
innovations in other markets. For the most part the results of the DAG analysis are in 
agreement with observed market behavior. Cereals flow the southwest corner of Niger to 
the arid regions to the north. This behavior was captured by both the GES and PC 
algorithms used in the analysis (Figure 3).   
Arlit and Dogondoutchi were found to be the markets where the initial price 
discovery innovations were detected in the fall of 2004 (Figure 4). This is apparent in the 
illustrations that depict the price decomposition of millet prices in Niamey (Figure 4). 
Both Arlit and Dogondoutchi were hard hit by the impending food crisis, but are located 
in very different regions. Arlit is in the arid north and Dognodoutchi is in the wetter 
southwestern portion.   
 
Early Warning Systems 
The early warning systems (EWS) operating in the region post monthly reports on the 
current status of food security through the internet and local media outlets. Under normal 
conditions EWS function more as information providers, detailing climatic and market 
conditions for a variety of stakeholders in the region. Warnings are issued, however, 
whenever food security reaches a critical level. The warnings serve as triggers to the international relief community food aid will be required over the short term. The 
warnings are separated into four categories: No Warning, Watch, Warning, Emergency.   
The Niger FEWS wasn’t able to detect the food crisis until November of 2004 
(Figure 5). During this month a food security Warning was issued on their website. Prior 
to this the alert level had been at No Watch for over a year. This Warning level was 
maintained for six months. In February 2005 a clearer picture began to emerge and a food 
security map was posted on their website (Figure 6). The warning was upgraded to the 
highest level, Emergency, in May 2005. Neighboring FEWS in Mali and Burkina Faso 
also had difficulty in forecasting the upcoming food crisis.  
 
Post-Crisis Analysis 
The primary finding from the analysis is that the Niger markets were well integrated as 
the time series analysis found 8 co-integrating vectors. This agrees with the prevailing 
Sen-based explanation that food markets were in principle working, but poverty kept 
rural households out of the marketplace. Hindsight provides perhaps the clearest 
explanation for what caused the Niger food crisis. One missing factor in both the DAG 
model and the FEWS forecasts is the role of the wealthier coastal markets. Food prices in 
Cote D’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Ghana are typically much higher than in the land locked 
countries of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. In surplus years coastal markets are better 
able to bid up prices. Traders are also more apt to bring cereals to the coastal areas where 
infrastructure is more developed and markets are less risky.   
Based on the DAG analysis, it appears that private agents in the millet markets 
were slightly ahead of the early warning systems in detecting the impending food crisis. Market price innovations around October 2004 were found in the Arlit and Dogondoutchi 
markets, but our initial findings place more of a December timeframe for when the 
formal warning systems detected a food crisis. This provides empirical support for the 
hypothesis that markets can, in certain circumstances, forecast more efficiently than more 
formal warning systems. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The integration of West African food markets has been heralded as a success. The 
analysis presented in this paper is in agreement with other findings from the region that 
the Sahelian markets have to a large extent been integrated following reform and 
liberalization measures. Price discovery and subsequent price information flows among 
markets move quickly from the food deficit to the food surplus regions.  
It’s likely that food markets may be too well integrated in the region. The 2005 
Niger food crisis raises previous concerns over the tenuous nature of regionally integrated 
markets. The evidence suggests that imports from neighboring countries shrank precisely 
at the time when they were most needed. Whether the neighboring countries became 
reluctant to export cereals into Niger or the wealthier coastal countries were successful in 
“outbidding” the Niger markets for the surplus grains is still unclear. In either event the 
2004 food crisis points out that affected areas were unable to allocate for themselves 
enough food through the free market system. a common theme that free markets won’t . 
Either through hoarding or government mandate, the Malian and suggest, however,.      
The results suggest that more emphasis should be placed on price expectations 
contained within market prices. One approach would be to better integrate FEWS with market information systems (SIM) in the West African region. Including a formal price 
forecasting engine, such as the DAG method used in this paper, is expected to increase 
the predictive power of the FEWS NET throughout the West African region.      
The results of this paper also imply the need for better integration among the FEWS 
network operating in the region. This will also require some monitoring of food prices in 
countries outside the FEWS network, particularly those on the neighboring coastal 
countries.  
Further studies will be required to assess the impacts of market integration. The 
results of this study suggest that market integration concentrates its benefits among the 
wealthier coastal countries. Arid regions within the poorer land locked countries appear 
even more vulnerable to food insecurity than they were prior to market reform.   
Future research should focus on a wider range of prices. It’s possible that the co-
movement between livestock and cereal prices would be an even better predictor of 
impending food insecurity. The pastoral areas hard hit by the 2005 food crisis rely 
heavily on livestock to safeguard themselves in years when crops fail. The time when 
animals begin entering markets may turn out to be the pest predictor that a food crisis 
looms on the horizon.    
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Figure 1 Population density and mean annual rainfall in Niger (FAO 1996).  
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Figure 2 Millet prices in Niger from January 1990 through July 2005                           
(a) GES Algorithm 
     
                                                               (b) PC Algorithm 
 
Figure 3 Pattern of information flow on 1990–2005 innovations on Niger Millet Prices 
from the GES and PC algorithms.    
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Figure 5 FEWS NET alert levels posted on their websites: April 2004 through December 
2005. 

















Figure 6 FEWS NET map of insecurity regions posted on their website in February 205 
Source: FEWS NET, Niegr, February 2005. 